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Introduction
In response to the perceived excesses of lawyers,1 formidable
grass-roots movements in many states have successfully promoted leg-
islation to limit damage recoveries in tort actions.2 In response to a
perceived public clamoring for tort reform, Republicans in the United
States Congress, as part of their ten-point "Contract with America,"
have pledged to enact tort reform measures,3 and thereby federalize
an area of law that, until now, has largely been left to the states.4
Until recently, few would have questioned Congress's power to
overhaul the tort system.5 The Supreme Court's Commerce Clause
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1997; B.A., University
of Arizona, 1988. I would like to thank Professor Ray Forrester and Professor David
Faigman for their ideas and assistance on this topic.
1. See Kenneth Lasson, Lawyering Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit of Fees and Justice,
74 B.U. L. REv. 723, 723-25 (1994).
2. See Eleanor N. Bradley, State Reform of Tort Laws Proceeds During Calls for Fed-
eral Intervention, U.S.L.W. (daily ed.), May 24, 1995.
3. See Nancy Mathis, GOP Urges Bipartisan Government, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 10,
1994, at Al.
4. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
5. Assumably, Congress would enact tort reform under the authority of the Com-
merce Clause, which allows Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States." U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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jurisprudence seemed "infinitely elastic,"'6 as illustrated by Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,7 where the Court held
that Congress had dominion over virtually every area of law as long as
there was a "rational basis" for taking action under the commerce
power.8
But in November of 1994, the Court's ruling in United States v.
Lopez 9 called into question the expansive Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence of the last fifty years. In Lopez, the Court held that Congress
had no authority to enact the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,10
which barred possession of firearms in school zones. In striking down
the law, the Lopez Court advanced a "substantial effects" test: Under
the commerce power, Congress could only regulate those activities
that had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.11 The Court
found that because guns near schools did not substantially affect inter-
state commerce, Congress had no authority to regulate them. 2
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion signaled a slight retreat from
the Court's traditionally expansive interpretation of Congress's com-
merce power. Lopez demonstrated that congressional commerce
power, like any other constitutional grant of power, does have limits-
the Court ruled that the Commerce Clause was not "a blank check"
for Congress.' 3
Opponents of tort reform have hailed the Lopez ruling as a revo-
lutionary godsend. 4 For years they have argued that state tort law
has no more than the "feeblest connection" to interstate commerce.'
5
They claim that tort law is a traditional state function immune from
federal pre-emption under principles of federalism. In light of the
Court's shift in Lopez, it is possible that the Court will entertain con-
6. Paul D. Kamenar, A Welcome Check on Voracious Government, TEx. LAW., May
15, 1995, at 17.
7. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
8. Id. at 276-77.
9. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994).
11. See 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
12. See id. at 1634.
13. T.R. Goldman, Tort Reform Opponents Have New Weapon in Lopez, CoNN. L.
TRm., May 15, 1995, at 15 (quoting Professor Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School).
14. Under Lopez, "the federal government can regulate the manufacture and distribu-
tion of a product, but not its possession or use." Id. (summarizing the interpretation of
Ned Miltenberg of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America). "Insofar as we are deal-
ing with automobiles and drugs, for example, there's no question that product liability law
on these kinds of things is constitutional. But if I go into a hospital and a doctor butchers
my operation, what is that connection with interstate commerce? This has always seemed
extremely dubious, probably before Lopez, but certainly after." Id. (quoting Alan Morri-
son, an attorney for Public Citizen's Litigation Group).
15. Id.
stitutional challenges to federal tort reform initiatives as beyond the
reach of the Commerce Clause.
This Note examines the constitutionality of congressional propos-
als to cap punitive damages.' 6 Part I provides an overview of some
recent attempts to reform the tort system. Part II briefly analyzes Lo-
pez. Part IH argues that the effect of massive punitive damage awards
on interstate commerce is more than substantial. Part IV argues that
the encroachment of punitive damage limitations on any area of tradi-
tional state concern is slight and is outweighed by the need to alleviate
interstate commerce of an onerous economic burden. Part V attempts
to define the commerce power's outer limits with respect to regulation
of punitive damages. I conclude that the Supreme Court, contrary to
the predictions of many, will uphold most federal attempts at tort re-
form as constitutionally permissible, Lopez notwithstanding.
I. Background Information
In November of 1994, the new Republican majority stormed into
the United States House of Representatives with their ten-point
"Contract with America." Key provisions of the Contract included a
constitutional amendment to balance the federal budget, a new crime
bill, welfare reform, tax reform, term limits, and tort reform.17 Re-
publican enthusiasm ran high for the first 100 days of the new congres-
sional term. Even President Clinton jumped on the Republican
bandwagon and signed three Contract-related bills into law.'"
But as the year 1995 wore on, the Contract lost its luster. 19 Rep-
resentative Bill Richardson, D.-N.M., put it this way: "There's been a
lot of rhetoric and a lot of press releases but hardly any bills signed
into law."'20 The new round of heated rhetoric and bickering did not
seem to differ at all from the partisan exchanges of the past. Republi-
cans met with substantial roadblocks in their efforts to enforce the
Contract. The balanced budget amendment initiative was killed in the
16. See, e.g., H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1995); see also Bradley, supra note 2. In focusing
exclusively on House proposals to cap punitive damages, the author is not unmindful of
other laudable tort reform proposals (such as loser-pays provisions, abolition of joint and
several liability, heightened requirements for standing, and raising the burden of proof to
clear and convincing evidence wherever punitive damages are at stake).
17. See Mathis, supra note 3, at Al.
18. See Peter Grier, Revolt in Review: What the 104th Congress Achieved, CHRISTIAN
SCL MONrrOR, Dec. 29, 1995, at 1. The three bills extended to Congress the labor stan-
dards required by private employers, decreased federal bureaucratic paperwork, and for-
bade Congress from imposing obligations on the states without providing the funds
necessary to accomplish them.
19. See generally Bryan Sierra, Washington News, UPI, Dec. 18, 1995.
20. Jim Abrams, Record Split for GOP in Congress, CHARLESTON GAZETrE, Nov. 27,
1995, at PlA (quoting Former Representative Bill Richardson, D-N.M).
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Senate,2 1 the new members of Congress breached their promise to
limit their terms in office, 22 welfare reform attempts were effectively
frustrated by a Clinton veto,23 and the new crime bill was tied up in-
definitely in the Senate.24 Despite these setbacks, the Republicans
stood their ground on tort reform, a key provision of the Contract.
Scorned by trial lawyers25 and urged on by the business lobby,26-
the Republicans were determined to pass tort reform legislation.27
According to business advocates, litigation was killing the American
economy.2 For years, they claimed, trial lawyers, operating under the
innocuous guise of stockholders and consumer action groups, licked
their chops whenever they spied a successful business, ready to claim a
piece of the pie.29 For years, frivolous lawsuits calculated to withstand
summary judgment motions had been crippling businesses, compelling
them to settle out of court to avoid the expense of litigation.3 0 Busi-
ness advocates further claimed that trial lawyers typically sought out
"sympathetic plaintiffs," calculated to provoke a jury to take a stand
against the privileged class.3 ' The ever-present fear of a "death sen-
tence," a dreaded multimillion dollar punitive damage award,32 dis-
suaded businesses from challenging the trial lawyers. Many
businesses were quick t9 settle lawsuits in order to avoid even the
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See Pamela M. Prah, Welfare Reform: Clinton Vetoes Welfare Package, DAILY LAB.
REP., Jan. 11, 1996, at D6.
24. See Abrams, supra note 20, at PIA.
25. See W. John Moore, Take the Money and Run, NAT'L J., Mar. 25, 1995, at 772. The
fact that the Association of Trial Lawyers of America is more generous in their financial
support of Democratic candidates ($2.04 million in the last election) than of Republican
candidates ($127,500) has "embittered many House Republicans." Id.
26. See Robert A. Rosenblatt, House Approves Curbs on Federal Civil Suits, L.A.
Tims, Mar. 8, 1995, at Al.
27. The main components of the proposed tort reform were ceilings on the amount of
punitive damages an injured party could receive and the abolition of joint and several
liability. See Bradley, supra note 2.
28. See, eg., Lawrence E. Smarr, Derail the Trial Lawyers' Gravy Train Before It De-
molishes Our Economy, WASH. TiMNES, Dec. 28, 1995, Letters, at A18.
29. See generally Lorri Grube, Cost of Litigation to U.S. Businesses, CHIF Exncu-
rrvE, Jan. 1, 1995, at 56.
30. See Senate Overrides President's Veto; Securities Litigation Reform Bill Now Law,
28 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 3 (Jan. 5, 1996) [hereinafter Senate Overrides].
31. Abdon M. Pallasch, Brother, Can You Spare $2.9 Million for a Cup of Coffee?,
Cm. LAW., March, 1995, at 5.
32. See Timothy S. Bishop & Jeffrey W. Sarles, Bonds, a Crushing Burden, NA'L L.J.,
Nov. 13, 1995, at C25. A recent example is the already infamous case of BMW of North
America, Ina v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996). The Supreme Court reversed a $4,000,000
punitive damage award (reduced to $2,000,000 on remittitur, id. at 1595) against a BMW
dealer who failed to inform a buyer that his car was refinished-that is, had lost some of its
original luster-even though it was not noticeable to the naked eye.
chance of a catastrophic financial loss at the hands of an unpredictable
jury 33
American businesses claimed they were losing their competitive
edge as a consequence of the exorbitant sums of "protection money"34
they had to pay the trial lawyers. 35 Business advocates further
claimed that the ever-present epidemic of costly litigation made it in-
creasingly difficult for them to compete with their foreign counter-
parts.36 Although the purity of its motive was questionable,37 the new
Congress set out to destroy the litigation epidemic through tort
reform.
Trial lawyers had reason to be concerned. They had grown
wealthy from the massive tort litigation of the seventies and eighties:
plaintiff attorneys from contingency fees, and defense attorneys from
the sheer volume of litigation needed to combat the plaintiffs. They
were not about to give up this cherished source of income, and were
prepared to fight to the death.38 Tort reform opponents delivered ur-
gent speeches throughout the country, typically appealing to the inter-
ests of the "little guy"39 and "the consumer," 40 the need to protect
"widows and orphans,' 41 and the fundamental right of all citizens to
"have their day in court."'42
Nonetheless, on December 22, 1995 the United States Senate
voted overwhelmingly to pass the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 199543 over President Clinton's veto.44 This securities reform
33. See Pallasch, supra note 31, at 5.
34. Robert A. Rosenblatt, Cox Vows Bill to Force Municipal Disclosure, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 20, 1995, at D3 (comparing trial lawyers to the "mobsters" of the past (such as Al
Capone), who "demanded 'protection' money from helpless merchants").
35. See Pallasch, supra note 31, at 5.
36. See id.
37. See Moore, supra note 25, at 772. According to Moore, the business community
and their political action committee lobbyists typically contribute heavily to Republican
candidates while trial lawyers and labor unions typically contribute heavily to Democratic
candidates. See id.
38. American Medical Association (AMA) member Dr. Kirk Johnson thus character-
ized the anticipated fight of the trial lawyers when confronted with medical malpractice
reform measures. See Brian McCormick, Tort Reform Victory in the House, AM. MED.
NEws, Mar. 27, 1995, at 1.
39. Bill Grady, Lawyer Has Taste for Excess, NEw OLEAuNs Tmms-PIcAYuNE, Dec. 3,
1995, at B1 (quoting trial lawyer David Bond). Only moments before Bond stepped into
his antique Rolls Royce, he had insisted that his role was to defend the "little guy."
40. Grube, supra note 29, at 56.
41. Representative John Dingell (D-Mich.) characterized the securities reform mea-
sure as "the skinning of widows and orphans." Phillip Terzian, Slow Motion Economic
Suicide, PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 6, 1995, at 7B (quoting John Dingell).
42. Henriette Champagne, Weld Ponders Legal System Changes, MASs. LAw. Wu.LY.,
Apr. 17, 1995, at 30 (quoting James Doyle, Treasurer of the Massachusetts Trial Lawyers
Association).
43. 15 U.S.C.S. § 77L (West 1996).
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measure was designed to combat law firms and professional plaintiffs
who filed "frivolous and extortionate" shareholders' strike suits when-
ever "a company's share price drop[ped] unexpectedly." 45 Essen-
tially, the Act gave greater legal protection to accountants and
corporate officials who estimated a corporation's future earnings. 4 6
The new law made it difficult for the owner of a single share of stock
to use an unfulfilled economic forecast as the sole basis for a lawsuit.4 7
This victory not only raised the morale of the beleaguered
Republicans, it revived the fateful specter of future tort reform meas-
ures, notably House Resolution 956, a House proposal to limit puni-
tive damages to $250,000 or three times economic damages, whichever
is greater, in nearly all civil actions.48 Trial lawyers and their advo-
cates in Congress (mostly Democrats) are crying foul, and are bound
to challenge these measures.
Although the trial lawyers lost this first battle, they are not yet
ready to concede defeat. If all else fails, tort reform opponents still
have one remaining trump card-the Constitution. Invoking the ca-
non of strict statutory construction, they could argue that Congress
has no explicit constitutional authority to regulate an inviolate sphere
of state concern, in this case, substantive tort law.49
44. See Senate Overrides, supra note 30, at 3.
45. David R. Sands, Bill to Reform Laws on Securities Fraud Nearing Passage, WAsH.
TIms, Dec. 3, 1995, at A3.
46. See Senate Overrides, supra note 30, at 3. The new "safe harbor" shields account-
ants' and company officials' economic forecasts from any automatic presumption of fraud
based solely on a sudden decline in value of company stock. See id. The safe harbor ap-
plies only where predictive statements are accompanied by "meaningful cautionary state-
ments identifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from
those in the forward-looking statements." Id. (quoting the new statute). Excluded from
the safe harbor were "projections made in the course of initial public offerings, tender
offers, blank check offerings, and penny stock offerings." Id.
47. According to Senator Pete Domenici, R.-N.Y., provisions were included to restrict
"professional plaintiffs," and to ban "bonus payments to pet plaintiffs, settlement term
disclosure, attorney compensation reform, sanctions for lawyers filing frivolous cases, [and]
restrictions on secret settlements and attorney's fees." Senate Overrides Security Bill Vote,
CONG. PRESS RELEASES, Dec. 22, 1996.
48. The House bill (HR 956) would also raise the burden of proof to "clear and con-
vincing evidence" where punitive damages are at stake. See Bradley, supra note 2.
49. Many trial lawyers have argued that punitive damage caps transgress the limits of
the Commerce Clause. See, for example, the lawyers quoted supra note 14. This argument
has support in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938), which held that
"Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State
whether they be local in nature or 'general' . . . . Supervision over either the legislative or
the judicial action of the States is in no case permissible except as to matters by the Consti-
tution specifically authorized or delegated to the United States."
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II. United States v. Lopez
The Court in Lopez listed "three broad categories of activity that
Congress may regulate under its commerce power":50 (1) "the chan-
nels of interstate commerce,"51 (2) "the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce," 52 and (3) "those activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce. '5 3 It is the last of these categories that engen-
ders the most controversy, and its parameters are at issue in Lopez.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis in the majority opinion begins
with the "first principles" of our federalist system. 4 The opinion
quotes James Madison: "The powers delegated by the proposed Con-
stitution to the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and in-
definite."55 In the words of former Chief Justice Marshall, the com-
merce power is restricted to "commerce which concerns more states
than one."56 Thus, since "[t]he enumeration [of the commerce power]
presupposes something not enumerated, ' 57 the Constitution's express
enumeration of interstate commerce must preclude congressional reg-
ulatory power over that which is not commerce, or over commerce
that is not interstate. These principles form the historical basis for the
Lopez decision: the federal government is a government of enumer-
ated powers, which are few and defined, and the Commerce Clause
grants Congress the limited power to regulate interstate commerce,
nothing more and nothing less.
However, cases arose where "interstate and intrastate aspects of
commerce were so mingled together that full regulation of interstate
commerce required incidental regulation of intrastate commerce. '5 8
The Court found that "the Commerce Clause authorized such regula-
tion."5 9 From this commingling principle eventually emerged the di-
rect/indirect distinction: Activities that directly affected interstate
commerce were within the reach of Congress, but activities that indi-
rectly affected interstate commerce were beyond the scope of the com-
50. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629-30 (1995).
51. Id. at 1629.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1629-30 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 1626.
55. THE FEDERALisT No. 45, at 313 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961),
quoted in Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
56. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824) (emphasis added), quoted in
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1627.
57. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 195, quoted in Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1627.
58. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1627.
59. Id.
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merce power.6 ° If the regulated activity was related to interstate
commerce only indirectly, it was not amenable to federal regulation,
lest there be "virtually no limit to the federal power. '61
In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,62 the Court stated the
test somewhat differently. Recognizing that the question of the scope
of Congress's power was "necessarily one of degree,"63 the Court held
that Congress had the power to regulate intrastate activities that had
"such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their
control [was] essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from
burdens and obstructions."s"
In exploring the outer limits of the commerce power, the Lopez
Court found federalism to be an important consideration:
[T]he scope of the interstate commerce power "must be consid-
ered in the light of our dual system of government and may not
be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce
so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our
complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction be-
tween what is national and what is local and create a completely
centralized government., 65
Chief Justice Rehnquist, rejecting the notion that "[a]ll activities af-
fecting commerce, even in the minutest degree may be regulated and
controlled by Congress, 66 agreed that the Court has never "declared
that Congress may use a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an
excuse for broad general regulation of state or private activities." 67
The Court cited Wickard v. Filburn68 to demonstrate the absolute
outer limits of the commerce power.69 Roscoe Filburn was a local
farmer who owned twenty-three acres of property where he grew
wheat to feed his livestock.70 The United States Secretary of Agricul-
ture fined him pursuant to the Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1938 for
60. See id. at 1628 (citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495, 546 (1935)).
61. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 548, quoted in Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628.
62. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
63. Id. at 37.
64. Id. (emphasis added); see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941)
("The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of
commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect inter-
state commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of
them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.").
65. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628-29 (quoting Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37).
66. Maryland v. Virtz, 392 U.S. 183, 204 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting), quoted in
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629.
67. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 197 n.27, quoted in Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629.
68. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
69. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
70. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114.
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exceeding the allotment of home-grown wheat authorized under the
statute.71 The Wickard Court upheld the fine because, although the
impact of Filburn's home-grown wheat on the market may have been
trivial, "his contribution, taken together with that of many others simi-
larly situated, [was] far from trivial."'72 When Filburn and similarly
situated wheat farmers opted to grow their own wheat rather than buy
it at the artificially inflated market price, they contributed, albeit min-
utely, to lowering the market wheat price.73 Hence, "[h]ome-grown
wheat... compete[d] with wheat in commerce." 74
The Lopez Court argued that even the marginal impact of home-
grown wheat on commerce was more tenable than the Government's
rationale for regulating guns in schools.75 Section 922(q) of the Gun-
Free School Zones Act 76 "by its terms ha[d] nothing to do with 'com-
merce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might
define those terms. '77 The government argued that, because guns in
schools "may result in violent crime" the costs of which were "spread
throughout the population" through insurance, they imposed substan-
tial costs on the population at large.7" In addition, the Government
argued that guns in schools undermined the educational process, and
therefore adversely affected national productivity and interstate com-
merce.79 The Court asserted that, under the Government's rationale,
"Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related to the
economic productivity of individual citizens: family law (including
marriage, divorce, and child custody), for example."80 The Court con-
cluded that to find that guns in schools substantially affected interstate
commerce, it "would have to pile inference upon inference in a man-
ner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by
the States."8'
Finally, the Court decided that under such an attenuated com-
merce doctrine there would be no distinction between what is "truly
national and what is truly local."8 Because the powers of Congress
71. See id. at 114-15.
72. Id. at 128.
73. See id. at 128. According to the Wickard Court, the purpose of the Agriculture
Adjustment Act was to regulate the prices of crops, and avoid "surpluses and shortages."
Id. at 115.
74. Id. at 128.
75. See 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994).
77. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
78. Id. at 1632.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1634.
82. Id.
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enumerated in the Constitution do not include a plenary police power,
the Gun-Free School Zones Act was unconstitutional.83
III. Substantial Effect on Interstate Commerce
If punitive damages have a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce, they are the legitimate object of federal regulation. So what
constitutes a substantial effect? Lopez did not define the term pre-
cisely, but gave numerous examples of cases defining the contours of
the test.84 The Lopez Court concluded that the commerce power's
limits derived from practical reasoning rather than any rigid mathe-
matical formula. 5 Like all other powers enumerated in the Constitu-
tion, the question of the commerce power's limits is "'necessarily one
of degree."' 86
We know what a substantial effect is not: If a federal regulation's
economic effect is so far removed from interstate commerce that it
amounts to a plenary police power for Congress when applied to other
areas of the law, then the regulation is unconstitutional.87 Thus, a
two-tiered inquiry emerges out of Lopez. On the one hand, the Lo-
pez Court is concerned with the extent of the regulated activity's eco-
nomic effect on interstate commerce. But the Lopez majority appears
equally concerned with the extent to which the regulation might upset
the delicate balance of federalism through congressional usurpation of
traditional state prerogatives. This Part argues that the actual eco-
nomic effect of tort suits is more than substantial, and Part IV ex-
plores the issues of federalism implicated by federal tort reform.
Punitive damages constitute a substantial part of the country's
"tort tax."88 The cost of tort litigation in the United States is a stag-
gering $80 billion a year, constituting 2.5% of the gross national prod-
uct (GNP), an amount unparalleled in any other country.8 9 That $80
billion figure includes only litigation-related expenses: attorneys' fees,
discovery, expert fees, payouts, settlements, and insurance costs.90 It
does not include the cost of avoiding litigation (e.g., unnecessary tests
that doctors perform) and the immeasurable costs to society in prod-
ucts that are never marketed for fear of future lawsuits.91 It defies
reason to suggest that these costs do not have a substantial effect on
the national economy.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 1629-30.
85. See id. at 1634.
86. Id. at 1633 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
87. See id. at 1633.
88. Leslie Spencer, The Tort Tax, FoRBEs, Feb. 17, 1992, at 40.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
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Furthermore, the size of punitive damage awards and the fre-
quency with which they are awarded have increased rapidly over the
last twenty years.92 California damage awards are particularly illustra-
tive of this trend. Before 1960 the highest punitive damage award in
California to be affirmed on appeal was $10,000. 93 In the sixties that
figure rose to $250,000,94 and in the seventies to $749,000.95 Even that
figure was dwarfed in the eighties by Eaton v. PKL Companies,96 in
which a record-breaking punitive damage award of $15,000,000 was
affirmed on appeal. Thus, from 1959 to 1989, the highest damage
awards have increased by a factor of well over a thousand, while the
cost of living has increased by a mere factor of three. 7 Regardless of
the comparatively negligible pre-1960 effect of punitive damages on
commerce, their potentially devastating economic impact has skyrock-
eted in recent years.
Arbitrary damage awards plague every kind of commercial enter-
prise.98 According to Theodore Olson, a partner with Gibson, Dunn
& Crutcher and a leading advocate of tort reform, excessive punitive
damages can cause harm and financial ruin to
the manufacturers of products .... the providers of financial
assistance, the growers of crops, auditors and accountants, the
transportation industry, homeowners, state and local govern-
ments and playgrounds, swimming pools and nurseries, conven-
ience stores, small businesses, restaurants, non-profits and
volunteers, school teachers, Little League coaches, and ... mil-
lions of others. 9
Although products liability suits are often cited as the most egregious
examples of punitive damage excesses,100 Olson lists some striking ex-
amples of recent awards from tort actions other than products liabil-
ity, all of which were affirmed on appeal.' 0' Among them are Sprague
v. Walter'0 2 ($31 million against a newspaper for defamation); Ebeling
& Reuss, Ltd. v. Swarovski International Trading Corp.0 3 ($16.5 mil-
92. See Punitive Damages Tort Reform: Hearings on S. 671 and S. 672 Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 6 (1995) (prepared statement of Theodore B.
Olson) [hereinafter Olson].
93. See Larrick v. Gilloon, 1 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Ct. App. 1959).
94. See Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (Ct. App. 1967).
95. See Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d 980 (Cal. 1978).
96. No. B010958 (Cal. Ct. App. July 18, 1989) (unpublished opinion).
97. The rate of inflation has increased an average of 6% a year over the last 30 years,
doubling the cost of living every 12 years. See Dan Rutherford, Tulsan's Tactics Vary with
7me, TULSA WoRLD, Mar. 2, 1996, at El.
98. See Olson, supra note 92, at 13.
99. Id.
100. See e.g., Spencer, supra note 88, at 40.
101. See Olson, supra note 92, at 12.
102. 656 A.2d 890 (Pa. 1995).
103. No. 88-4878, 1992 WL 211554 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
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lion for fraud and patent infringement); Chemstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mu-
tual Insurance Co.'04 ($14 million for insurance bad faith); Latham
Seed Co. v. Nickerson American Plant Breeders, Inc. 0 ($10 million
for fraud); and Hanson v. American National Bank and Trust Co."°
($5.75 million for breach of a construction contract). Olson concludes
that "[t]hese judgments, and the additional suits they inspire, dislocate
and impede commerce, produce discrimination against interstate com-
merce and disrupt and reorder the decisionmaking process throughout
America." 07
Moreover, while the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on Con-
gress's power to regulate punitive damages under the commerce
power, the Court has implicitly recognized the devastating effect of
punitive damages on interstate commerce. In her dissent in Brown-
ing-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,108 Justice
O'Connor first recognized that
[t]he threat of such enormous awards has a detrimental effect on
the research and development of new products. Some manufac-
turers of prescription drugs, for example, have decided that it is
better to avoid uncertain liability than to introduce a new pill or
vaccine into the market. Similarly, designers of airplanes and
motor vehicles have been forced to abandon new projects for
fear of lawsuits that can often lead to awards of punitive
damages.' 09
Later, in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,110 a majority of
the Court recognized that the Constitution might impose tangible,
substantive limits on the amount of punitive damages a jury may
award."'
In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,12 the Court further recognized
that juries disproportionately inflict arbitrary damage awards on out-
of-state businesses. According to the Honda Court, "the rise of large,
interstate and multinational corporations has aggravated the problem
of arbitrary awards and potentially biased juries. 11 3 Moreover,
"presentation of evidence of a defendant's net worth creates the po-
104. 42 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision), cert. denied 116 S. Ct.
1847 (1996).
105. 978 F.2d 1493 (8th Cir. 1992).
106. 844 S.W.2d 408 (Ky. 1992), cerL granted and judgment vacated, 509 U.S. 918, affd
on remand, 865 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1993).
107. Olson, supra note 92, at 14.
108. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
109. Id. at 282 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation
omitted).
110. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
111. See id. at 18-19.
112. 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994).
113. Id. at 2340.
tential that juries will use their verdicts to express biases against big
businesses, particularly those without local presences.
1 1 4
Finally, in the seminal case of BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore,"5 the Court overturned a $2,000,000 punitive damage award
against a BMW dealer for its failure to disclose to a buyer that the
vehicle had been repainted, even after the Alabama Supreme Court
had already reduced the jury's original award of $4,000,000. Although
the Court relied principally on the Due Process Clause, the Court also
alluded to the dormant commerce power in reaching its conclusion." 6
BMW had made it a practice not to report to its dealers any re-
pairs it made to any vehicle in its inventory that accounted for no
more than 3% of the car's value." 7 In calculating the damage award,
the Alabama jury attempted to punish BMW for its cumulative
wrongful acts, not only in Alabama, where this practice was illegal,
but even in those states where such a practice might have been en-
tirely legal." 8 This, the Court held, was an improper consideration." 9
Thus, although the majority in Gore did not consider the constitution-
ality of federal tort reform measures, the majority implicitly recog-
nized the difficult financial burden a runaway jury can impose on
interstate commerce.
Indeed, regionalism and a distrust of outsiders may combine to
induce a local jury to avenge a local plaintiff aggrieved by a far-away
company. Improved mobility and communications, contrary to the
views of many, do nothing to decrease the tension between small-town
juries and interstate businesses. On the contrary, the rise of interstate
corporations, local prejudice against out-of-state businesses, and the
increased ease in asserting jurisdiction over them, may serve only to
exacerbate the deleterious impact of windfall punitive damage awards
on interstate commerce.
In the final analysis, punitive damages arising out of commercial
lawsuits encompass all areas of tort law and have a direct impact on
the economy at large. At 2.5% of the GNP, of which punitive dam-
ages compose a large part,120 the tort system's pervasive economic im-
pact differs vastly from the relatively negligible economic effect of
guns in schools. Moreover, the Supreme Court has implicitly recog-
nized the devastating economic effects of windfall damage awards,
114. Id. at 234041.
115. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
116. See iL at 1604 ("While each state has ample power to protect its own consumers,
none may use the punitive damages deterrent as a means of imposing its regulatory policies
on the entire Nation.").
117. See id. at 1593.
118. See id. at 1595.
119. See id. at 1604.
120. See generally Olson, supra note 92.
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and appears willing to accept caps, should Congress decide to give
them the force of law.
IV. Concerns with Federalism
Equally troubling to the Lopez Court was the potential oblitera-
tion of our federalist system, that is, the clearly defined boundaries
between those governmental functions that are properly national and
those that are properly local.121 According to Justice Kennedy, feder-
alism safeguards the rights of the people: "'A healthy balance of
power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce
the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.""'  More impor-
tantly, Justice Kennedy wrote, it is necessary for political accountabil-
ity that the lines be clearly drawn between federal and state
prerogatives:
Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of
entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to
do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries
between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur
and political responsibility would become illusory.'m
Without clearly defined roles for the federal and state governments,
we risk diffusion of political responsibility. The tenuous rationale sup-
porting federal regulation of guns in schools could potentially destroy
the federal-state balance, 24 "foreclose[] the States from experi-
menting and exercising their own judgment in an area to which the
States lay claim by right of history and expertise,"'1  or, at the very
least, confuse the roles of the federal and state governments in areas
(e.g., public schools and education) where they have been long
established. 26
121. See 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
122. Id. at 1638 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Gregory v. Aschcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
458 (1991)).
123. Id.
124. See id. at 1640.
125. Id. at 1641.
126. See id. at 1640-41. Traditional state functions, which inhere in state sovereignty
and are immune from federal encroachment, were defined generally in National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding that Congress could not constitutionally en-
force federal wage and hour standards on state and municipal employees). Usery lists sev-
eral examples of traditional state functions, including "fire prevention, police protection,
sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation." Id. at 851. The Usery Court defined
the category of traditional state functions as those typically "performed by state and local
governments in discharging their dual functions of administering the public law and fur-
nishing public services." Id.
However, the Court later found in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), that the Usery standard for traditional state functions was unwork-
able: "We held that the inquiry into a particular function's 'traditional' nature was merely
a means of determining whether the federal statute at issue unduly handicaps 'basic state
Punitive damages have historically been considered a traditional
state concern. The Supreme Court ruled in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins'2 7 that neither the federal courts nor Congress had the
power to declare substantive rules of common law in any state, be
they rules of commercial law or tort law.1' s If we were to rely entirely
on the express language of Erie, Congress might be precluded from
passing any tort legislation, no matter how immediate the relation to
interstate commerce.
However, contrary to the restrictive language of Erie, a wealth of
precedent holds that where interstate commerce is burdened, areas of
law traditionally controlled by the states may be regulated by Con-
gress. 12 9 Indeed, no problem more concerned our Constitution's
Framers than the need to protect interstate commerce from parochial
state regulation. 30 James Madison observed that to remedy "[t]he de-
fect of power" under the Articles of Confederation, "[a] very material
object" of the Constitutional Convention was the "relief of the States
which import and export through other States, from the improper con-
tributions levied on them by the latter."' 13 ' Madison, a strong de-
fender of state sovereignty, nonetheless considered the need for a
central commerce authority to be paramount, lest the more "commer-
cial" states exploit the others. 3 2 Thus, where an area of law so bur-
dens interstate commerce, allowing local interests to levy "improper
contributions"' 33 on out-of-state interests, an area to which the states
would otherwise lay "claim by right of history and expertise,"'" that
area must be pre-empted by Congress.
Since Erie, the Supreme Court has not yet ruled directly on the
extent to which Congress may pre-empt state tort law. However, re-
prerogatives,' but we did not offer an explanation of what makes one state function a 'basic
prerogative' and another function not basic." I& at 540 (quoting United Transp. Union v.
Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1982) (citation omitted)). According to the
Garcia Court, it was "difficult, if not impossible, to identify an organizing principle" that
would distinguish traditional state government functions from other governmental func-
tions. Id. at 539.
127. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
128. See id. at 78.
129. See eg., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977); City of Burbank
v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 626-40 (1973); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Transit Comm'n v. United States, 289 U.S. 121, 127-28
(1933); Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351-52 (1914).
130. See Trm FEDERALiST No. 42 (James Madison).
131. Id. at 283 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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cent cases suggest that Congress's reach is far.135 Indeed, "[w]hen
Congress has 'unmistakably... ordained' that its enactments alone
are to regulate a part of commerce, state laws regulating that aspect of
commerce must fall."'1 36 Under the commerce power, federal laws
may expressly pre-empt traditional fields occupied by the states where
it is "the clear and manifest purpose of Congress" to do so.' 37 No
traditional state function, much less tort law, is absolutely immune
from federal encroachment, so long as Congress acts pursuant to the
Commerce Clause.
For most commercial torts, congressional pre-emption of punitive
damages would not lead to the obliteration of federalism. Given the
paramount desire of our Constitution's Framers to unburden com-
merce from "parochial" state interests, Congress's authority to regu-
late punitive damage awards arising out of commercial lawsuits falls
squarely under the commerce power.
V. Limits of Federalism
Lopez stood principally for the proposition that there are limits
to the federal commerce power.' 38 So what are those limits with re-
gard to federal pre-emption of punitive damages? Those limits must
be consistent with the Court's definition of the commerce power's
scope as a practical one, based on an intuitive, common sense judg-
ment rather than a rigid formula. 39
Wickard lends support to the proposition that even the most mi-
nuscule activities that upset the balance of market forces are enough
to substantially affect interstate commerce.' 40 Although Lopez ac-
135. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 522-23 (1992) (holding that a
federal statute requiring warning labels on cigarettes pre-empted petitioner's claims based
on state law imposing a legal duty to warn on cigarette manufacturers).
136. Rath Packing, 430 U.S. at 525 (citation omitted) (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963)).
137. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, quoted in Rath Packing, 430 U.S. at 525.
138. Justice Kennedy, in a discussion with Hastings law students, affirmed that the
Court in Lopez struck down a federal statute for "the unremarkable fact that the federal
government is one of enumerated powers." Justice Anthony Kennedy at the University of
California, Hastings College of the Law (February 8, 1996).
139. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1636 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
140. See generally 317 U.S. 111. In the wake of Lopez, the Wickard "home-grown
wheat" case raises some interesting questions with respect to home-grown weed. Califor-
nia voters recently enacted Proposition 215, a ballot initiative permitting persons with ail-
ments such as cancer, AIDS, anorexia, or "any other illness for which marijuana provides
relief," to possess or cultivate marijuana for personal use upon a doctor's recommendation.
CAL. HEALTH & SkAi. CODE § 11362.5(b)(1) (West Supp. 1997). In response, the Clinton
Administration has threatened, pursuant to the Drug Enforcement Agency's licensing
scheme for doctors who prescribe drugs, to suspend the licenses of all doctors who pre-
scribe or recommend marijuana to their patients. See William Claiborne, Federal Warning
on Medical Marijuana Leaves Physicians Feeling Intimidated, WASH. Posr, Jan. 1, 1997, at
cepts Wickard in principle, it appears that the Lopez Court desires to
retreat from Wickard's expansive interpretation of the commerce
power.14 1 Common sense tells us that Congress would hardly be justi-
fied in regulating damage awards arising out of garden variety neigh-
borhood "nuisance" cases, where the requisite connection with
interstate commerce is tenuous at best. In like manner, common
sense informs us that Congress would not be justified in regulating
damages in a case where a schoolyard bully is sued for battery. 42 For
Congress to regulate torts of such a local character would cross the
line, as their nexus with interstate commerce is dubious at best.143 For
Congress to regulate local torts would invite federal regulation of vir-
tually all areas of law traditionally left to the states, and obliterate the
distinction between "what is truly national and what is truly local."'"
Bearing this in mind, it is evident that cases wholly "local" in charac-
ter would be immune from federal regulation: battery, noncommer-
cial slander, sexual harassment in a noncommercial setting, or false
imprisonment of one local resident by another, to name a few.145
A6. Marijuana possession and cultivation for personal use fall squarely within the domain
of a state's traditional power to regulate public health, safety, and morals. Cf. Lopez, 115
S. Ct. at 1634; Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 501 U.S. 560, 568 (1991) (defining police
power).
However, Wickard lends strong support to concurrent federal and state jurisdiction
over commerce in marijuana, even commerce which is wholly intrastate. See Wickard, 317
U.S. at 119-20. Although the Lopez Court cited Wickard as "perhaps the most far reaching
example" of expansive commerce power, Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630, the Court still upheld
Wickard's rationale. See id. at 1630-31. To pre-empt California's liberal marijuana laws
under Wickard, Congress or the Attorney General would merely have to demonstrate the
existence of a national market for marijuana. Moreover, Congress or the Attorney Gen-
eral could further argue that home-grown marijuana competes with FDA-approved drugs
in interstate commerce. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128; see generally Champion v. Ames
(The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (holding that Congress has the authority to pro-
hibit the interstate carriage of lottery tickets, which, although legal in one state, were con-
trary to public morals of another). Finally, no inherent limitation in the commerce power
would preclude Congress from regulating marijuana out of existence through its power to
tax. See, e.g., Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1937) ("Inquiry into the
hidden motives which may move Congress to exercise a power constitutionally conferred
upon it is beyond the competence of the courts."); see also United States v. Sanchez, 340
U.S. 42 (1950).
141. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630 (citing Wickard as the most "far reaching example of
Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity").
142. However, it is conceivable that damages arising out of extortionate activities of the
schoolyard bully may belong to a class of activities that affect commerce when their aggre-
gate effect is considered. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (holding that
Congress could criminalize the extortionate credit activities of a local loan shark because
the wrongful acts of all loan sharks affected commerce when viewed in the aggregate).
143. See Goldman, supra note 13, at 15.
144. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
145. See Goldman, supra note 13, at 15 (citing Professor Eugene Volokh of UCLA law
school, who distinguishes between "commercial" and "non-commercial" torts).
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If Lopez is remembered for anything, it will be as the moment
when the Supreme Court "decline[d] to proceed any further" in ex-
panding its already generous interpretation of the commerce
power.146 In the grand scheme of things, Ms. O'Leary's milking cow
affects interstate commerce in much the same way as Roscoe Filburn's
home-grown wheat. Similarly, when Billy the bully extorts lunch
money from his schoolmates, he affects commerce in much the same
way as the defendants in Lopez and Perez. But if federal prosecution
of the schoolyard bully is justified because the bully's activities some-
how affect interstate commerce, would not this rationale support fed-
eral regulation over most local matters, thereby destroying every last
vestige of the federalist principles upon which this country was
founded?
Going back, once again, to the notion that the commerce power's
scope is a "practical" distinction, we can define it thus: damage
awards arising out of all but the most local torts affect interstate com-
merce in a manner that is not incompatible with federalism. Thus,
federalization of all but the most local damage awards is constitution-
ally permissible under Lopez.
VI. Conclusion
There is no inherent limitation to the Commerce Clause that
would preclude federally imposed caps on punitive damages. Much to
the disappointment of the trial lawyers' lobby and other opponents of
tort reform, Lopez is nothing revolutionary. Although Lopez does
signal a slight retreat from the expansive Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence of the last fifty years, it is not apparent that the Court will fur-
ther limit congressional commerce power.
The Court will likely hold that in all but the most local of civil
actions, massive punitive damage awards substantially affect interstate
commerce. Neither punitive damage reform nor the commerce ra-
tionale supporting it would lead to federal usurpation of any tradi-
tional state police power. Because punitive damages have become so
commercial in nature, federal pre-emption would be permitted. The
Court is likely to find punitive damage limitations favorable, neces-
sary, and completely in keeping with the Constitution and the Fram-
ers' intent, given the impact of massive damage awards on interstate
commerce.
146. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
